FDIT is a tokenized money market fund share, not a crypto “token project”

Fidelity Digital Interest Token (FDIT) reads like a Web3 asset. Mechanically, it behaves like a tokenized share class of a regulated cash product. The underlying is Fidelity® Treasury Digital Fund’s OnChain class (ticker FYOXX), whose shares are “recorded - or digitized - on a public blockchain,” while the transfer agent keeps the official ownership record in book-entry form per the July 25, 2025 summary prospectus.

On-chain, FDIT is an ERC-20 token with 18 decimals, and Etherscan presents it explicitly as “Fidelity Digital Interest Token (FDIT)” on the token contract.

The cleanest way to think about FDIT is “a blockchain addressable wrapper around money market fund shares.” That framing matters because it changes what tokenomics even means here. There is no meme-driven reflexivity to model. No on-chain fee switch to fantasize about. The economic engine is the underlying Treasury money market portfolio, and the financial instrument is a share claim that can be transferred with compliance controls. If you’re coming from governance-token work like SwissBorg tokenomics, treat this as cash management in token form.

Fidelity itself has publicly referenced FYOXX as its first tokenized investment product “available for select institutions.” That is as close as you get to an issuer-level “launch announcement” in the public web record.

Market data pages further reinforce the intent. RWA.xyz describes FDIT as representing one share of FYOXX and provides traditional identifiers like CUSIP 31617H813 and ISIN US31617H8135.

CoinGecko lists the asset at a constant $1.00 and flags essentially nonexistent trading activity, which is consistent with an institutional share wrapper rather than a free-floating token.

Supply mechanics: shares in, shares out

FDIT supply is not “emissions.” It is creation and redemption against fund shares.

CoinGecko displays Max Supply = ∞, which is a blunt but directionally correct representation of the fact that the share count can expand with subscriptions.

Etherscan shows a current “Max Total Supply” of 178,970,494.48 FDIT and 3 holders on the token page. That “max total supply” is effectively “current total supply” as Etherscan renders it for this token.

The contract architecture is explicitly mintable and burnable under a permission system. In the implementation package, the mint and burn functions exist as protected operations.

We can also see minting and burning happening in the wild via contract calls. For example, an early mint of 500,000 FDIT was executed on August 6, 2025.

And large burns were executed later. A burn of 13,053,124.08 FDIT occurred on January 1, 2026.

RWA.xyz lists an “Inception Date” of August 4, 2025 for the asset record. Treat that as a metadata point, not as a legal formation date.

Important nuance for anyone used to DeFi token supply narratives. “Circulating supply” here mostly equals “shares outstanding,” not “float.” With only a few holders shown on Etherscan, distribution is concentrated by design or by current go-to-market, not because a team wallet is waiting to dump. For definitions that often get mixed up here, see our tokenomics FAQ.

Cashflows: where the yield goes, where the fee leaks

Start with the portfolio. A September 22, 2025 fund supplement states the fund normally invests at least 99.5% of total assets in cash and U.S. Treasury securities, limited to Treasuries (and cash) with remaining maturity of 93 days or less or issued with maturity of 93 days or less.

Then fees. The OnChain share class fee table lists a 0.25% management fee, with a contractual reimbursement/expense cap that brings “total annual operating expenses after fee waiver” to 0.20%, and the arrangement is stated to remain in effect through August 31, 2027.

RWA.xyz reports “Management Fees: 0.20%.” That lines up with the capped figure, not the gross management fee line item.

As a TradFi realist, this is the core “tokenomics” truth. The fee is the issuer’s revenue capture. The token holder’s yield is the underlying T-bill/cash yield minus those expenses. There is no separate on-chain protocol fee stream that accrues to FDIT holders. Your “fee distribution” is simply “you keep what the fund doesn’t charge.” Unlike the IUSD design, there isn’t an extra on-chain fee layer to model.

Costs related to blockchain transaction validation are also addressed. The summary prospectus says that, at the time of publication, transaction fees associated with validating transactions on Ethereum “will be borne by the Adviser or its affiliates,” but it explicitly leaves room for that to change so investors may be responsible in the future.

Distribution policy is not described in an on-chain-native way in the public sources. The prospectus does state that “distributions you receive” are taxable as ordinary income or capital gains, which implies traditional mutual fund distribution mechanics rather than a purely on-chain rebasing token model.

One more constraint that matters for token design: the fund “will not invest in any crypto assets.” So the token is the technology rail, not the investment thesis.

Transfer rules: compliance rails, not DeFi rails

If you only look at “ERC-20,” you will misprice the control surface.

The prospectus is explicit that the blockchain record is secondary. The transfer agent maintains the official record in book-entry form, and blockchain transactions are reconciled with the official records “at least a daily basis during business days under normal conditions.”

That means on-chain state is not the final arbiter of ownership in the same way it is for an on-chain-native asset. In TradFi terms, the blockchain is closer to an interoperable sub-ledger, with the transfer agent acting as registrar.

Now the smart contract side. The source code shown on Etherscan for the token references DTCC copyright and a “Compliance Aware Token Framework (ERC-20)” that includes “controlled” and “clawback” functionality.

The implementation contract contains interfaces that make the control set very clear:

This is not “decentralization theater.” It is closer to how regulated transfer restrictions actually work, expressed in code. Fidelity can keep the asset on a public chain while still retaining the operational capabilities that regulators and institutional clients expect.

The trade-off is obvious. These controls put a hard ceiling on censorship resistance and composability. Even if you can technically transfer an ERC-20 24/7, the issuer can freeze addresses, disable transfers, and claw back balances if the compliance process demands it.

There is also an upgradeability surface. Etherscan labels the token code as “ERC-20 Source Code (Proxy)” and links to an implementation contract. Proxy patterns are normal for institutional-grade systems, but they introduce version risk and governance-by-operator risk.

Valuation framing: what you can and cannot model

FDIT is priced at $1.00 across the major trackers because the product is structured as a stable NAV money market fund share, not because there is an algorithmic peg to defend.

The summary prospectus includes the standard money market warning: the fund seeks to preserve $1.00 per share but “cannot guarantee it will do so,” and it is not a bank account and not FDIC insured.

So the right valuation model is almost boring:

That last bullet is where crypto-native intuition breaks. A token can settle 24/7, but the prospectus says purchases and redemptions “will only be processed during normal business hours on business days.” So the asset can move, but the issuer window still sets when you can go to cash at NAV.

CoinGecko’s page reflects this institutional reality in a blunt way: it shows $0 24-hour trading volume and states that FDIT tokens “have stopped trading” on listed exchanges. That is consistent with a product that is not actually distributed through public crypto venues in any meaningful size.

On the holder base, secondary reporting suggests extreme concentration. Secondary reporting described Ondo Finance as the main investor around initial issuance, using FDIT as a reserve asset in its own product stack. That is not a tokenomics “partnership announcement.” It is a distribution channel and early AUM bootstrapping strategy.

Modelability conclusion. FDIT is highly modelable at the “net yield” layer. It is weakly modelable at the “secondary market liquidity” layer. Public docs are thin on operational details for on-chain transfer constraints in live production, and that lowers confidence in parameter stability for anyone building composability assumptions. For a contrasting RWA-style structure, compare this with SSTN tokenomics.

If you want more frameworks for evaluating assets like this, browse our research reports.

Risk register: the dominant risk is “not your ledger”

The product is interesting because it pulls TradFi cash management onto an open network. The risk is that it does so without adopting the settlement finality norms crypto users assume.

Top 3 risks

  1. Ledger primacy and administrative control (dominant risk). Trigger: a compliance event, sanctions screening hit, disputed transfer, court order, or operational reconciliation break. Mechanism: the blockchain record is explicitly secondary and reconciled to official books daily, and the token framework includes compliance modules plus clawback, freeze, and transfer-disable controls. Who bears it: token holders and integrators who treat “ERC-20 receipt” as final settlement. Measurable indicators: transfer reverts or frozen-balance events on-chain, transfers being disabled, clawback function usage, and any divergence between expected on-chain ownership and transfer-agent-confirmed ownership.

  2. Money market fund risk (rate, income, and “break the buck” tail). Trigger: sharp rate shifts, market stress in front-end funding, or idiosyncratic Treasury-market dislocation. Mechanism: NAV targets $1.00 but is not guaranteed, the fund is not FDIC insured, and interest rate changes can reduce prices of money market securities. Who bears it: holders, especially anyone treating FDIT as a cash equivalent without mark-to-market or liquidity haircuts. Measurable indicators: portfolio yield compression, elevated daily flows, and any sponsor support language changes in future supplements.

  3. Secondary liquidity and accessibility risk. Trigger: a holder needs to exit outside the issuer processing window or outside eligible channels, or a DeFi venue tries to list it as if it were a free-floating stable asset. Mechanism: purchases/redemptions are processed during normal business hours on business days, and public trackers show effectively zero exchange volume and “stopped trading” messaging. Who bears it: holders needing immediacy, and protocols that mistakenly assume deep liquidity. Measurable indicators: persistent $0 reported volume, holder count staying extremely low, and widening friction between “token transferable” and “redeemable at NAV.”

Dominant risk: ledger primacy and administrative control is the one that actually changes system design choices for builders.

The prospectus language makes it unambiguous that the blockchain is not the official shareholder registry for FYOXX. The transfer agent keeps the official book-entry record, and reconciliation happens at least daily during business days. If you are building treasury automation or collateral workflows, you cannot assume “on-chain transfer equals final settlement.” You have to assume “on-chain transfer is a message that must remain consistent with the registrar.”

Then layer in the token controls. The implementation package exposes a compliance context (whitelist), the ability to freeze accounts and even partially freeze balances, the ability to disable transfers globally, and a clawback primitive that can move tokens between accounts when authorized. That suite is coherent for a regulated product. It is also a direct contradiction to the bearer-asset mental model that makes DeFi composability cheap.

In practice, it forces three consequences:

If you are advising a protocol or treasury on integrating assets like FDIT, this is where tokenomics consulting stops being “emissions design” and becomes risk budgeting, legal-operational diligence, and hard constraints on automation. If that’s the kind of work you need, see our tokenomics services.



This article is part of our Tokenomics Deep Dive series.