PMUSD is a stablecoin design that’s really a liquidity design

PMUSD (shown as pmUSD on-chain) is a synthetic stablecoin in the RAAC ecosystem, positioned as “precious metals USD” and backed by tokenized in-situ gold reserves rather than bank deposits or money market funds.

The headline claim matters less than the mechanism. RAAC describes PMUSD as a forked collateralized system derived from f(x), where the stablecoin is paired with a leverage leg that absorbs volatility. In RAAC’s framing, the stablecoin stays “stable” while the levered side eats the gold price movement. That is a float-management choice as much as it is a collateral choice.

One more detail that changes how you model it. The RWf(x) implementation is designed to be manager-operated design. Market actions are restricted to authorized managers and the docs explicitly call out multi-sig managers with RAAC as a necessary signatory. So PMUSD does not behave like a fully permissionless “mint when you want” stablecoin. Supply can be elastic, but the supply valve has a human control plane.

Supply reality: elastic issuance beats any FDV story

PMUSD supply is not an emissions schedule problem. It is a mint-and-redeem problem. The token is minted inside the RWf(x) market system, and can expand as collateral flows in, or as managers deliberately mint to push the system back toward a target collateral ratio.

On Ethereum mainnet, RAAC lists a “pmUSD Market” deployment with the PMUSD contract as the FractionalToken at 0xc0c17dd08263c16f6b64e772fb9b723bf1344ddf. Etherscan’s token contract page labels that same asset “Precious Metals USD (pmUSD).”

As of March 4, 2026, Etherscan shows “Max Total Supply” (effectively current total supply) of 109,701,203.622222222222222208 pmUSD and 240 holders for the token contract.

CoinGecko lists PMUSD with max supply shown as ∞, which is the right mental model for an on-demand stablecoin unless the protocol hard-caps issuance in code.

From a Liquidity Structure Realist lens, the key question is not “what’s the total supply.” It is “what portion is effectively tradable float.” PMUSD is currently traded on Ethereum DEX venues including Curve and Uniswap v3, with CoinGecko’s listed DEX venues showing pools like PMUSD/FRXUSD and PMUSD/CRVUSD on Curve and PMUSD/USDC on Uniswap v3.

That creates a simple but harsh constraint. Any attempt to scale PMUSD supply faster than DEX liquidity depth will show up as peg volatility first, and only later as “TVL growth.” When the float expands, the market needs somewhere to warehouse it. If it can’t, the peg becomes the warehouse. For comparison, our Cap USD analysis frames the same float-versus-liquidity constraint through a different stablecoin design.

Minting mechanics: collateral ratio targeting can create supply bursts

RAAC’s RWf(x) docs describe the system as a fork of the f(x) protocol that uses RWA-backed tokens as collateral to mint a stablecoin (fToken) and a leverage token (xToken). The docs state the first stablecoins to launch are pmUSD and xpmUSD, backed by tokenized gold.

Mechanically, PMUSD sits inside a two-token capital structure:

On mainnet, RAAC’s deployment page lists the PMUSD market components, including the Market, FractionalToken (PMUSD), LeverageToken, Treasury, and ProxyAdmin addresses. It also lists a BaseToken address shown as “TB Token.”

The float-critical point is that RWf(x) is not only “deposit collateral, mint stablecoin.” The docs include a scenario where if the collateral ratio rises above target, a manager can mint more PMUSD without adding more collateral to restore the stability ratio.

That is a lever for supply expansion that looks stabilizing in a model and destabilizing in a market if misused. It can reduce overcollateralization quickly. It can also create sudden PMUSD float that needs to be placed, typically into AMMs or lending venues. If placement fails, PMUSD sells off. Your “stability operation” becomes your depeg catalyst.

The docs also spell out what happens when things go the other way. In an under-collateralized state, minting and other operations are blocked, and fToken redemption switches to pro-rata redemption where PMUSD holders are entitled to a proportional share of remaining base collateral.

That last detail is the real backstop. The peg is not guaranteed by arbitrage against $1 in cash. It is a claim against an on-chain collateral pool, potentially with haircut dynamics under stress.

Collateral model: “discounted gold” is conservative, but it is also opaque

RAAC’s whitepaper states PMUSD is backed by tokenized in-situ gold reserves, and names I-ON Digital Corp as the tokenization partner for gold tokenization.

The same section states the in-situ gold reserves are discounted by 80% versus real-time spot gold, which the paper says results in a reserve ratio of 5:1 backing PMUSD.

This is supply optics done right. Overcollateralization is not a marketing line. It is a float dampener. In principle, a 5:1 reserve ratio gives the system room to absorb collateral volatility, oracle noise, and even some operational friction without immediate insolvency. It also increases the “cost” of expanding PMUSD supply, since each incremental PMUSD needs meaningfully more gold exposure behind it if the system keeps that ratio.

But there is a trade-off. This design shifts the hard problem from volatility to verification. The core question becomes: can the market continuously validate that the base token truly tracks tokenized gold, that custody and audits exist as claimed, and that redemptions are credible in edge cases. The whitepaper makes the backing claim. It does not, by itself, provide on-chain proof-of-reserves for an off-chain asset. A comparable RWA disclosure problem is discussed in our STAC token review.

When verification is weaker than the collateral ratio is strong, you still get depegs. They are information depegs, not solvency depegs. The market sells first and asks questions later.

Fees, burns, and fiscal flows: the docs and the whitepaper do not fully line up

The RAAC whitepaper describes RWf(x) “stablecoin silos” where a silo treasury mints a COD token representing a share of the treasury, and where 50% of net on-chain yield and 100% of off-chain yield generated by treasury assets is paid pro-rata to COD holders.

In that same RWf(x) section, the whitepaper states RAAC acts as a coordination layer, awarding emissions in return for 40% yield sharing on on-chain yields and 10% RWA asset ownership, which the paper frames as receiving 10% of off-chain yields, with yields accruing to the RAAC Treasury initially.

The whitepaper also states a 2% mint fee is charged and distributed between ecosystem partners (in the RWf(x) economics section).

Now the reality check from the technical docs. RAAC’s RWf(x) documentation states the current fee structure for the stablecoin minting system is configured with no fees and incentives, with related parameters disabled, and no reservePool or registry in that configuration.

That mismatch is not automatically bad. Protocols often publish an economic target state before finalizing production parameters. It does, however, reduce modelability today. If fees are disabled in the live configuration, then PMUSD does not carry an explicit on-chain “carry cost” or “mint tax” that could naturally slow supply growth or fund a stability budget.

From a float perspective, fees are a speed limit. No fees means issuance can be cheap for the authorized manager set. That tends to increase supply responsiveness. It also tends to increase the probability of overshoot if incentives are misaligned.

Control plane: upgradeability and manager gating dominate PMUSD’s risk surface

RWf(x) is explicitly described as upgradeable, with the documentation stating all contracts must be upgradeable. On Etherscan, the PMUSD token is shown as an “ERC-20 Source Code (Proxy)” contract using a transparent upgradeable proxy pattern, with an implementation address displayed on the token page.

RWf(x) market operations are manager-only, and the docs frame authorized silo managers as multi-sigs with RAAC as a necessary signatory. This is a deliberate attempt to prevent unauthorized minting, especially functions that could mint stablecoins without collateral inappropriately.

Security posture has some support in published audit history. RAAC’s published audit history lists three audits by Pashov Audit Group dated August 20, 2025, November 17, 2025, and November 27, 2025.

This is where the Liquidity Structure Realist view gets blunt. Permissioned control and upgradeability can protect the peg in normal times. They also create a single choke point for catastrophic supply events. In stablecoins, the dominant failure mode is rarely “math was wrong.” It is “control was misused,” intentionally or accidentally.

CoinGecko’s pricing history suggests PMUSD is still early in its public market lifecycle, with an all-time high listed on January 21, 2026 and an all-time low listed on January 25, 2026. Early lifecycle is when governance and operational processes are least battle-tested and when liquidity is usually thinnest.

Risk analysis: PMUSD’s peg is a float problem first, a collateral problem second

Dominant risk: manager-controlled supply expansion and upgrade/admin risk. The RWf(x) design concentrates power in authorized managers and upgradeable contracts by design. That can be a rational trade if your collateral is RWA and you need controlled operations. It also means the market is always pricing the probability of a “bad action” event, not just a “bad price” event. If you’re new to stablecoin modeling, our tokenomics FAQ covers the baseline concepts.

Here is the mechanism that matters. RWf(x) includes logic and operational paths that allow managers to mint PMUSD to restore a target stability ratio when collateral value rises, which is explicitly described in the docs via the “mint without adding base token” scenario. In isolation, that is a rebalancing tool. In a real market, minting creates new float that must be distributed into AMMs, borrowers, or treasury strategies. If that placement fails or is front-run by sellers, PMUSD trades below peg and stays there until either liquidity deepens or supply contracts through redemptions. A useful comparison is our reUSD case study, which also treats stability as a market-structure problem.

The ugly version is worse. If keys are compromised, if governance is captured, or if managers overreach, “stability minting” can become effectively unbacked issuance into shallow liquidity. Even if the system is technically collateralized in accounting terms, PMUSD holders are exposed to price impact and redemption friction. Under stress, the docs state the system can flip into an under-collateralized handling mode where minting is blocked and redemptions become pro-rata against remaining base collateral. That is a solvency backstop. It is not a peg backstop.

Audits reduce smart contract bug risk. They do not remove admin risk. The audits list confirms coverage exists, but without reading each report’s scope and findings, you should treat “audited” as a partial checkmark, not a guarantee of invariant safety under real operational behavior. We track similar patterns and failure modes in our research reports.

Top 3 risks

  1. Manager/admin event risk (dominant). Trigger: compromise of manager multi-sig, governance capture, or emergency intervention that changes parameters or mints into the market. Mechanism: manager-only access to Market operations and upgradeable contracts enables rapid supply changes and potentially adverse upgrades, producing float shocks that exceed AMM depth. Who bears it: PMUSD secondary-market holders and LPs (they eat the depeg and inventory risk). Indicators: sudden PMUSD total supply increases on Etherscan, abrupt changes in proxy implementation, and persistent PMUSD discount on Curve/Uniswap pools listed on CoinGecko.

  2. Gold tokenization and valuation risk. Trigger: breakdown in the tokenization partner pipeline, custody dispute, audit failure, or oracle/price feed divergence between the base token and spot gold. Mechanism: if the base token’s value or redeemability is impaired, the system can move toward under-collateralization, at which point RWf(x) shifts to blocked minting and pro-rata redemption, converting “$1 stablecoin” into “claim on remaining base collateral.” Who bears it: PMUSD holders and xToken holders, with PMUSD holders facing haircut risk in under-collateralized redemption mode. Indicators: base token price deviations, collateral ratio deterioration, and increased redemption pressure reflected in AMM imbalance and widening spreads on PMUSD pools.

  3. Liquidity and market structure risk. Trigger: supply expansion without matched liquidity provisioning, or a risk-off event where LPs pull liquidity while PMUSD inventory needs to exit. Mechanism: PMUSD is primarily DEX-traded (Curve and Uniswap v3 pairs are listed on CoinGecko), so peg maintenance is heavily dependent on AMM depth and arbitrage capacity rather than direct issuer redemption rails. Who bears it: LPs and traders first (inventory losses), then PMUSD holders (depeg persistence). Indicators: falling on-chain liquidity around PMUSD pools, higher slippage, and longer-lived deviations from $1 across listed markets.

If you are building around PMUSD and need a higher-confidence model of effective circulating supply, manager constraints, and liquidity requirements, it is worth treating this as a market-structure problem, not a valuation problem. A short engagement for tokenomics consulting can focus on float controls, stress testing issuance bursts, and designing liquidity backstops that survive real AMM conditions.



This article is part of our Tokenomics Deep Dive series.